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EXECUTIVE POWER IN THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION AND THE
DECISION TO SEEK CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION FOR A
MILITARY ATTACK AGAINST SYRIA:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORIES OF UNILATERAL ACTION
Kenneth R. Mayer*
INTRODUCTION
The primary axiom of the unilateral-powers literature is that the institutional
setting and political incentives that confront presidents push them to seek
maximum discretion over policy. The straightforward implication is that presidents
will seek control (Terry Moe calls it autonomy 1)—always contentious given the
competitive political authority at the heart of separation of powers, but necessary
to them given their interests and position in the political system. 2 Empirically,
presidents are expected to (and do) act unilaterally, moving first to put their stamp
on policy and process, shape institutional structures, and alter the status quo to
shift government outputs toward their preferred position. A corollary is that
presidents will not voluntarily surrender the discretion that their institutional
position provides and their political interest demands, because doing so leaves their
fate in the hands of other actors with very different goals and interests. Unilateral
action can increase governability, as the President retains the capacity to function
even in the face of gridlock or partisan opposition. 3
* © 2014 Kenneth R. Mayer. Professor, Department of Political Science and Affiliate
Faculty at La Follette School of Public Affairs, University of Madison-Wisconsin. I am
indebted to James Sieja, who provided valuable research assistance.
1
Terry M. Moe, Presidents, Institutions, and Theory, in RESEARCHING THE
PRESIDENCY: VITAL QUESTIONS, NEW APPROACHES 337, 364–65 (George C. Edwards III
et al. eds., 1993).
2
See id.; Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure,
57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 11–12 (Spring 1994). See also generally WILLIAM G.
HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE POLITICS OF DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ACTION
(2003) (arguing that presidents regularly set public policies over vocal objections by
Congress, interest groups, and the bureaucracy); KENNETH R. MAYER, WITH THE STROKE
OF A PEN: EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER (2001) (analyzing the pattern of
presidents’ use of executive orders and describing an office much more powerful and
active than the one depicted in the bulk of the political-science literature). This notion finds
analogues in other presidency literatures, such as Stephen Skowronek’s argument that the
presidency is a uniquely “order-shattering institution in that it prompts each incumbent to
take charge of the independent powers of his office and to exercise them in his own right.”
STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS
TO BILL CLINTON 20 (6th prtg. 2003) (emphasis in original).
3
Norman Ornstein makes this argument in the context of recess appointments. See
Norman J. Ornstein, Disarming the White House, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2014, http://www.
nytimes.com/2014/01/22/opinion/disarming-the-white-house.html?_r=0.
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President Barack Obama reflected this pattern, to the consternation of many
of his supporters. Although he explicitly and repeatedly promised to reverse many
Bush administration policies and practices and rejected his predecessor’s view of
executive power, he actually made few dramatic retrenchments and even went
further in some areas. The prison at Guantanamo Bay remains open, and the
President has all but given up on his promise to close it. He restarted the military
commission process to adjudicate cases against detainees charged with terror
offenses, 4 and he continued the policy of extraordinary rendition. 5 His
administration invoked the state-secrets doctrine to head off litigation, and it
claimed executive privilege to keep information from Congress. 6 His Justice
Department has aggressively investigated leaks of classified information and
initiated more prosecutions under the Espionage Act (eight) than all previous
administrations combined (three). 7 On two occasions, the Office of Legal Counsel
advised the President that statutory restrictions in appropriations acts were
unconstitutional and could be ignored. 8 The frequency of drone attacks has
increased dramatically, and President Obama claims the authority to order the
killing of American citizens who engage in terror activities abroad, without any
due process protections or independent checks. 9 He ordered military action in
4

Jordan J. Paust, Still Unlawful: The Obama Military Commissions, Supreme Court
Holdings, and Deviant Dicta in the D.C. Circuit, 45 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 367, 367–68
(2013).
5
LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 251 (3d ed. 2013); Michael J. Glennon,
National Security and Double Government, 5 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 1, 2 (2014).
6
Louis Fisher, The Law: Obama’s Executive Privilege and Holder’s Contempt:
“Operation Fast and Furious”, 43 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 167, 179–80 (2013).
7
Glennon, supra note 5, at 7; David McCraw & Stephen Gikow, The End to an
Unspoken Bargain? National Security Leaks in a Post-Pentagon Papers World, 48 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 473, 492 (2013).
8
Both issues involved language that prohibited the executive branch from funding
certain diplomatic activities. These were a 2009 ban on paying expenses for a U.S.
delegation to any United Nations body chaired by a country that the Secretary of State had
designated as a sponsor of international terrorism and a 2011 ban prohibiting the White
House Office of Science and Technology Policy from entering into any bilateral agreement
with China or Chinese companies. See generally Memorandum from Virginia A. Seitz,
Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, on the Unconstitutional Restrictions on
Activities of the Office of Science and Technology Policy in Section 1340(A) of the
Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (Sept. 19,
2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/opiniondocs/conduct-diplomacy.pdf; Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, on the
Constitutionality of Section 7054 of the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Appropriations Act (June
1, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/opiniondocs/section7054.pdf. The Office
of Legal Counsel concluded that these activities fell within the President’s exclusive
authority to conduct diplomatic relations, rendering the statutory language unconstitutional.
Id.
9
Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 8, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/world/middleeast/secret-us-memo-made
-legal-case-to-kill-a-citizen.html?pagewanted=all. NBC News obtained a “White Paper,”
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Libya without any congressional approval, maintaining that the operation did not
constitute a “war” that required a congressional declaration or fell within the
meaning of the War Powers Act. 10 The President has “continued, and in some
ways, expanded, Bush era surveillance policies” 11 and has embraced weak reforms
only after the leaks by Edward Snowden revealed a monumental electronic
surveillance apparatus that included monitoring of allied leaders and collecting
data on Americans’ phone calls. 12 Compared to President George W. Bush, “in
several fundamental respects we have experienced wider assertions of
unconstitutional executive authority under President Obama.” 13
Domestically, President Obama revised immigration policy when it became
clear that Congress would not act, suspending prosecutions for many illegal
immigrants in what became known as the “mini-DREAM Act”; 14 declined to

which it claimed was based on a classified memo that outlined the basic argument for the
U.S. government’s ability to kill American citizens it believes to be an “associated force.”
See Michael Isikoff, Justice Department Memo Reveals Legal Case for Drone Strikes on
Americans, NBC NEWS (Feb. 4, 3013, 5:57 PM), http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/
2013/02/04/16843014-justice-department-memo-reveals-legal-case-for-drone-strikes-on-a
mericans. According to The New York Times, the leaked paper “closely tracks the rationale
in [the classified] document.” Charlie Savage & Scott Shane, Memo Cites Legal Basis for
Killing U.S. Citizens in Al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013
/02/05/us/politics/us-memo-details-views-on-killing-citizens-in-al-qaeda.html.
10
See Memorandum from Caroline D. Krass, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen.,
Office of Legal Counsel, on the Authority to Use Military Force in Libya 7 (Apr. 1, 2011),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/libya.pdf. Louis Fisher, a long-standing
opponent of presidential uses of force absent congressional authorization, found the
administration’s justifications “not only strained, but several cases incredulous.” Louis
Fisher, The Law: Military Operations in Libya: No War? No Hostilities?, 42 PRESIDENTIAL
STUD. Q. 176, 177 (2012). In ignoring the War Powers Resolution, Bruce Ackerman and
Oona Hathaway write, President Obama had pushed beyond what President Clinton and
President Bush had done: “Make no mistake: Obama is breaking new ground, moving
decisively beyond his predecessors.” Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, Death of the
War Powers Act?, WASH. POST, May 17, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
death-of-the-war-powers-act/2011/05/17/AF3Jh35G_story.html.
11
Glennon, supra note 5, at 6.
12
See Barton Gellman, Obama’s Restrictions on NSA Surveillance Rely on Narrow
Definition of ‘Spying’, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world
/national-security/obamas-restrictions-on-nsa-surveillance-rely-on-narrow-definition-of-sp
ying/2014/01/17/2478cc02-7fcb-11e3-93c1-0e888170b723_story.html; Alison Smale et. al,
Data Suggests Push to Spy on Merkel Dates to ’02, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2013, http://www.
nytimes.com/2013/10/28/world/europe/data-suggests-push-to-spy-on-merkel-dates-to-02.ht
ml.
13
Michael D. Ramsey, Meet the New Boss: Continuity in Presidential War Powers?,
35 HARVARD J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 863, 863 (2012).
14
Robert Delahunty and John Yoo argue that President Obama wrote into law what
Congress had declined to enact via an unconstitutional abdication of the President’s “take
care” obligations. Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama
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defend the Defense of Marriage Act against legal challenges; 15 used recess
appointments when the Senate would not confirm his nominations; 16 centralized
policy making within the White House, relying on policy “czars” for advice and
coordination and hinting that he would ignore appropriations language that limited
his ability to pay them; 17 relied on signing statements just as earlier presidents
had; 18 and used the regulatory process to limit greenhouse gas emissions to address
climate change in response to Congress’s failure to enact clean-energy
legislation. 19
In short, President Obama has taken a broad view of executive authority,
acting to preserve and extend his autonomy in both domestic and foreign policy
and at times pushing beyond what President Bush was willing to do. In acting
unilaterally, he articulated the same justifications as his predecessors did:
compensating for congressional opposition and dysfunction, protecting national
security and the national interest, interpreting statutory and constitutional language
in a way that preserves presidential flexibility, and protecting the institution of the
presidency. He behaved, in other words, just as theory predicted, even when his
actions differed sharply from what he said as a candidate about what he would do
as President. His presidency validates the empirical implications of the unilateralaction model.
Placed against this pattern, President Obama’s decision to ask for
congressional approval of a military attack against Syria in August 2013, after the
regime used chemical weapons against civilians, stands out as a clear outlier. Here,
President Obama departed from what unilateral-action theories predicted, from his
pattern of showing no reluctance to do it alone in other contexts, and from the
longer historical pattern of presidents actively working to expand the reach of their
authority and their range of discretionary action. It is thus an anomaly that invites
analysis and explanation, and it presents an opportunity to assess the state of
unilateral-action theory.
There are several elements to consider. The first is whether the President’s
action (or, more properly, inaction) poses a challenge to the theory itself. If a
President departs from the underlying expectations in such a prominent way, is it
merely an aberration, or is it an indication that the theory is wrong? The theoretical
Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take
Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 835–51 (2013).
15
Kathleen Tipler, Obama Administration’s Non Defense of DOMA and Executive
Duty to Represent, 73 MD. L. REV. 287, 291–99 (2013).
16
Peter E. Quint, Implications of the President’s Appointment Power, 73 MD. L. REV.
85, 90–99 (2013).
17
Mitchell A. Sollenberger & Mark J. Rozell, The Law: Prerogative Power and
Executive Branch Czars: President Obama’s Signing Statement, 41 PRESIDENTIAL STUD.
Q. 819, 819–20, 831–32 (2011).
18
See Christopher S. Kelley, Rhetoric and Reality? Unilateralism and the Obama
Administration, 93 SOC. SCI. Q. 1146, 1149–57 (2012).
19
Jody Freeman, Climate and Energy Policy in the Obama Administration, 30 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 375, 376, 378–85 (2012).
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predictions are surely not that a President will never forego unilateral action when
faced with a decision point (indeed, there are many examples of presidents doing
just that). But such a conspicuous deviation, where the President’s ability to act
was unchallengeable, needs exploration, and fitting it into the existing framework
requires more than the facile reasoning that the President must have felt that the
costs of action were greater than the costs of inaction, or vice versa.
Alternative explanations might be that it was a “mistake” that resulted from a
flawed assessment of what the situation required or that it was the result of
previous poor decisions that put the President in an impossible situation. Here, the
insight of political scientist Richard Neustadt’s view of the presidency is
instructive. In Presidential Power, Neustadt argued that presidents lack the
authority needed to carry out the job. As a consequence, presidential power comes
not from the ability to command but instead is “the power to persuade.” 20
Scholarly attention to unilateral powers challenged this view, providing a
theoretical model and empirical evidence showing that presidents can frequently
get their way via unilateral action. 21
Neustadt’s view and the unilateral approach are usually seen as antagonists,
but when applied to this event, both converge on the same conclusion. Neustadt
emphasized the importance of “power stakes” to presidents, which he defined as
the understanding of the effects that a current decision can have on future events
and ability to act. An effective President “guards his power prospects in the course
of making choices” 22 and understands that “adequate or not, a President’s own
choices are the only means in his own hands of guarding his own prospects for
effective influence.” 23 Neustadt was writing about persuasion and influence, not
about formal authority and institutional process, but the argument is almost
identical to unilateral theory’s emphasis on the President’s need to preserve
discretion and flexibility.
Finally, I ask what this means for the argument that presidential authority
expands but does not contract, with each successive increase becoming a new point
of departure for future expansions (i.e., the “ratchet effect”). 24 President Obama
provides some support for both sides in this debate. On the one hand, he has been
at least as aggressive as President Bush in moving unilaterally in most areas and
thus validates the ratchet metaphor. But on the other hand, in explicitly declining
to act unilaterally, President Obama also confirms that expanding presidential
20

RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS: THE
POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 11 (1990).
21
See HOWELL, supra note 2, at xiv–xvi; MAYER, supra note 2, at 16–22; Kenneth R.
Mayer, Going Alone: The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 427, 427–50 (George C. Edwards III &
William G. Howell eds., 2009); Moe supra note 1, at 364–65; Moe & Wilson supra note 2,
at 3.
22
NEUSTADT, supra note 20, at 47.
23
Id. at 49.
24
ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY,
LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 131–32 (2007); Mayer, supra note 21, at 443.
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authority is not the only possibility. Explicitly backing away from unilateral action
might appear to roll back presidential power by setting a new precedent in the
opposite direction, which might mean that future presidents may have to justify
their own expansive readings and explain why they are ignoring this earlier
precedent.
Placing President Obama’s use-of-force decision within the unilateral-action
framework leads to two conclusions. The first is that President Obama’s decision
to go to Congress regarding Syria was a mistake, not because it was
constitutionally unnecessary, but because it will constrain his discretion and make
it much more difficult to act credibly in future contingencies. The second is that it
is not likely to have any consequences for the contemporary practice of
presidential use of force. Instead, it will serve as a cautionary tale for future
presidents, who will dismiss President Obama’s decision as an aberration not
applicable to what they are facing.
I. OBAMA AND SYRIA
Since the beginning of unrest and civil war in Syria in 2011—which has killed
over one hundred thousand people and displaced millions of desperate
refugees 25—President Obama rejected direct U.S. military involvement in the
conflict. But at an August 2012 press conference, the President said that the
preparation or use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government was a “red line”
that would “change [the] calculus” for military action. 26 He would come to regret
those words. President Obama had authorized limited military aid to rebel forces in
June 2013 in the aftermath of reports that Syrian forces had used chemical
weapons in some small-scale attacks; it is unclear whether any arms had actually
been shipped, in part because of worries that lethal aid could fall into the hands of
Jihadi groups affiliated with the resistance. 27
On August 21, 2013, the Syrian military used chemical weapons in an attack
that killed nearly fifteen hundred civilians, including nearly four hundred
children. 28 Shortly thereafter, the White House signaled that President Obama was
ready to order a military strike to punish Syrian President Bashir al-Assad and

25

See Alan Cowell, War Deaths in Syria Said to Top 100,000, N.Y. TIMES, June 26,
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/world/middleeast/syria.html.
26
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to the White House Press
Corps (Aug. 20, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/2
0/remarks-president-white-house-press-corps.
27
JEREMY M. SHARP & CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL
33487, ARMED CONFLICTS IN SYRIA: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE 8–10 (2013).
28
Karen DeYoung & Anne Gearan, U.S. Officials’ Strong Words on Syria Signal
That Attack Is Near, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/n
ational-security/kerry-lays-out-evidence-of-chemical-weapons-attack-by-syria/2013/08/30/
d1c19d58-118f-11e3-bdf6-e4fc677d94a1_story.html.
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degrade his capability to launch further chemical attacks. 29 Administration
officials, including Secretary of State John Kerry, justified the impending military
action as moral, important to U.S. strategic interests, and, in the secretary’s words,
“directly related to our credibility and whether countries still believe the United
States when it says something.” 30
But several days later, President Obama announced that he would seek
congressional approval for an attack, even though he had “decided that the United
States should take military action against Syrian regime targets” and believed that
he had “the authority to carry out this military action without specific
congressional authorization.” 31 This step was unprecedented (at least in the modern
era) as there are no other instances of a President asking for advance congressional
approval for an attack of this scale. While presidents have sought congressional
authorization prior to ordering limited military operations, most of the cases were
from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and involved sending personnel into
combat or prolonged defensive operations. 32 More recent examples involved
peacekeeping operations (Lebanon in 1983) or broader Area Resolutions
authorizing the President to use the military in Asia (1955) and the Middle East
(1957) if he deemed it necessary. President Bill Clinton asked for congressional
support for an air campaign in Kosovo in 1999, but he was clear that he would not
base his ultimate decision on congressional approval.
There is no doubt that under long-standing practice and formal legal opinions,
President Obama had the authority to order a military attack relying solely on his
commander-in-chief power. Even if an attack on Syrian chemical weapons
capabilities presented a unique set of circumstances—no direct threat to
Americans, no United Nations approval, and no support from any allies—that

29

See Mark Landler et al., Obama Set for Limited Strike on Syria as British Vote No,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/ 08/30/us/politics/obama-syria.
html; Charlie Savage, Obama Tests Limits of Power in Syrian Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
8, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/ 2013/09/09/world/middleeast/obama-tests-limits-of-pow
er-in-syrian-conflict.html?pagewanted=all; Thom Shanker et al., Obama Weighs “Limited”
Strikes Against Syrian Forces, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/
08/28/world/middleeast/obama-syria-strike.html.
30
DeYoung & Gearan, supra note 28.
31
President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on Syria (Aug. 31, 2013),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/31/
statement-president-s yria.
32
Jennifer Elsea and Richard Grimmett identify five cases prior to 1900: two in 1798
when Congress authorized the use of the Navy to protect American vessels engaged in civil
shipping from seizure by France; one in 1802 authorizing the Navy to attack and seize
Tripolitan ships; one in 1815 authorizing action to protect American shipping from
Algerian attacks; and one in 1819 for protecting American shipping from piracy. JENNIFER
K. ELSEA & RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31133, DECLARATIONS
OF WAR AND AUTHORIZATIONS FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE: HISTORICAL
BACKGROUND AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 88–94 (2011).
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would not change the prevailing legal understandings of what the President could
do. 33
The President’s decision to go to Congress thus represented an anomaly in the
patterns of unilateral power that was inconsistent with both President Obama’s
overall reliance on executive authority and his previous uses of military force.
President Obama had shown less concern with strict constitutional process in
ordering attacks in Libya without advance congressional approval. In that instance,
the Office of Legal Counsel advised him that “[t]he President had the
constitutional authority to direct the use of military force in Libya because he
could reasonably determine that such use of force was in the national interest. . . .
[P]rior congressional approval was not constitutionally required to use military
force in the limited operations under consideration.” 34 The administration also
argued the operations did not constitute “hostilities” contemplated in the War
Powers Act because they “do not involve sustained fighting or active exchanges of
fire with hostile forces, nor do they involve the presence of U.S. ground troops,
U.S. casualties or a serious threat thereof, or any significant chance of escalation
into a conflict characterized by those factors.” 35
Unilateral theory observes that presidents surrender discretion at their own
peril, and what followed President Obama’s announcement reinforced that danger.
Legislators immediately moved to put conditions on any use of force as they added
their own caveats and constraints. Even if the President fully expected to obtain
approval (a confidence that turned out to be wildly overestimated, as noted below),
he could not have expected legislators to pass whatever he asked.
Despite reports that the contemplated attack would involve missiles fired from
ships and aircraft well outside of Syrian borders, the President proposed an openended authorization to use military force to “prevent or deter the use or
proliferation” of chemical weapons or to “protect the U.S. and its allies and
partners against the threat posed by such weapons.” 36 That language would not
survive. After the Senate Foreign Relations Committee completed its deliberations,

33

See Ian Hurd, Bomb Syria, Even if It Is Illegal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/28/opinion/bomb-syria-even-if-it-is-illegal.html?_r=0
(arguing that an attack would be illegal under international law—presumably whether
Congress authorized it or not—but that the President should order it anyway).
34
Memorandum from Caroline D. Krass, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen.,
Office of Legal Counsel, on the Authority to Use Military Force in Libya 1 (Apr. 1, 2011),
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/libya.pdf.
35
Report from Joseph E. Macmanus, Acting Assistant Sec’y, Dep’t of State and
Elizabeth L. King, Assistant Sec’y, Dep’t of Defense, to John A. Boehner, Speaker of the
House of Representatives, on the U.S. Activities in Libya (June 15, 2011).
36
Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec’y, Draft Resolution of Use
of U.S. Military in Syria, N.Y. TIMES, August 31, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/interactiv
e/2013/09/01/world/middleeast/syria-resolution.html.
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the legislation it reported to the floor on a narrow 10–7 vote 37 imposed a “limited
and specified” condition on the use of force, required a written presidential
determination delivered in advance to Congress including a certification that the
United States “has used all appropriate diplomatic and other peaceful means” to
address the threat of chemical weapons in Syria, required ongoing reports,
prohibited the use of American combat personnel inside the country, and set time
limits. 38 A House version authorized only a single round of missile strikes, with
time limits and a ban on troop deployments. 39 The administration opposed the ban
on deployments—“boots on the ground”—because it would “take off the table an
option that might or might not be available to a president of the United States to
secure our country” in the event the President decided it was necessary. 40
The decision to go to Congress is even more perplexing given that all of the
available evidence suggests that Obama would have lost, and lost badly, any
congressional vote on military action. While the unofficial vote counts do not
consider what might have happened once the White House began applying intense
pressure, the numbers were overwhelmingly negative from the start. In early
September, The Washington Post counted 263 House members as against or
leaning against, and only 25 expressing public support. 41 The count in the Senate
was 23 in favor and 43 against or leaning against, with 34 undecided. 42 A CNN
tally was 25 yes votes and 179 no in the House with the remaining undecided or
unknown. 43 A CBS count was 32 in support to 199 opposed in the House and 27
for to 33 opposed in the Senate. 44 These counts occurred after the House leadership
had publicly expressed support for the authorization and after the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee had reported its limited resolution to the floor. The President
was losing by at least 6 to 1 (and by up to 10 to 1) in the House and nearly 2 to 1 in

37

Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against the Government of Syria to
Respond to the Use of Chemical Weapons, S.J. Res. 21, 113th Cong. (2013), available at
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/S.%20J.%20 Res.%20211.pdf.
38
Id.
39
Karen Tumulty, Reps. Chris Van Hollen, Gerry Connolly Draft Narrow
Authorization of Force in Syria, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.co
m/politics/van-hollen-connolly-draft-narrow-authorization-of-force-in-syria/2013/09/03/7c
bc6b60-14c0-11e3-b182-1b3bb2eb474c_story.html.
40
Hearing on U.S. Military Action Against the Syrian Government Before the S.
Comm. Foreign Relations, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of John Kerry, Sec’y of State),
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/S.%20J.%20Res.%20211.pdf.
41
Aaron Blake, Where the Votes Stand on Syria, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2013, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/09/02/where-the-votes-stand-on-syria/.
42
Id.
43
U.S. House: How They’ll Vote on Syria Strike, CNN POLITICS (Sept. 10, 2013, 4:00
PM), http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2013/09/politics/syria-congress-vote-count/house.ht
ml.
44
Stephanie Condon, Little Support for Syria Strike in Congress, CBS News Estimate
Shows, CBSNEWS.COM (Sept. 10, 2013, 5:37 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/little-su
pport-for-syria-strike-in-congress-cbs-news-estimate-shows/.
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the Senate. This was shaping up to be an embarrassing public repudiation on a
crucial national-security issue.
An unexpected set of events saved the President from defeat. At a joint press
conference in London on September 9, 2013, with British Foreign Secretary
William Hague, Secretary of State Kerry was asked if there was “anything at this
point that [President Assad’s] government could do or offer that would stop an
attack.” 45 Kerry answered almost off the cuff: “Sure. He could turn over every
single bit of his chemical weapons to the international community in the next
week. Turn it over, all of it, without delay, and allow a full and total accounting for
that. But he isn’t about to do that, and it can’t be done, obviously.”46 Almost
immediately, both President Assad and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to
do just that. The next day, in a nationally televised address that was originally
intended to explain military action, President Obama announced that he would
instead pursue a diplomatic solution. 47 Syria agreed to join the international treaty
banning chemical weapons, and the United Nations Security Council unanimously
approved a resolution requiring Syria to surrender its chemical weapons. 48 Had he
not enjoyed this reprieve, President Obama would have been in the difficult
position of appearing indecisive and lacking the support of his own party on a warpowers question.
Why would a President choose to handcuff himself, severely limit his
flexibility in a core area of unilateral action, and invite what would have been a
humiliating defeat? Taking the President at his word—that he believed he had the
authority to order an attack but would be in a stronger political and strategic
position with a congressional authorization—does not tell us why or how he could
have miscalculated so badly in assessing the chances of actually obtaining that
authorization or why he would choose to “transfer[] greater responsibility for U.S.
foreign policy to a Congress that is more divided, more incapable of reasoned
debate or action, and more dysfunctional than any in modern American history.” 49
As a pragmatic matter, the President may have wanted Congress to share the
blame if the attack went badly or triggered wider U.S. involvement or a broader
conflict, particularly given deepening public skepticism of interventionist foreign
45

John Kerry, Sec’y of State, Remarks with United Kingdom Foreign Secretary
Hague (Sept. 9, 2013), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/09/21395
6.htm.
46
Id.
47
Michael D. Shear, Planned as Call to Act, Obama’s Speech Became Plea to Wait,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/12/world/obama-syria.html?
pagewanted=1&_r=0.
48
Colum Lynch & Anne Gearan, U.N. Security Council Unanimously Passes Syria
Chemical Weapons Resolution, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/national-security/un-approval-near-on-syrian-chemical-arms/2013/09/27/da007
544-27aa-11e3-9372-92606241ae9c_story.html.
49
David Rothkopf, The Gamble: Five Big Consequences of the President’s Call to
Let Congress Decide About America’s Syrian Intervention, FOREIGN POLICY (Aug. 31,
2013), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/31/the_ gamble.
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policy. He may have been looking for a way not to attack and gone to Congress
because he anticipated that they would say no. Some observers attribute President
Obama’s backtracking on Syria to a failure to obtain international cooperation for a
military attack, or to British Prime Minister David Cameron’s inability to obtain
parliamentary approval for British involvement in the military response. 50 The
decision may have resulted from deep divisions and uncertainty among President
Obama’s advisors about the consequences of an attack or from concern that
unilateral action would complicate future congressional support for foreign policy
issues, specifically on Iran. 51 Perhaps President Obama felt the need to distinguish
himself from President Bush and deflect criticism that he was unilaterally taking
the country into another war. His earlier “red line” remark may have boxed him
into a position in which his credibility was at stake. 52 It is even possible—however
unlikely it appears to be—that President Obama envisioned a diplomatic solution
all along, threatening military action only to bring Syria and Russia to the
bargaining table and going to Congress to buy time for his plan to work. 53
Even if President Obama was constitutionally correct in seeking congressional
authorization, wanted to avoid a military attack altogether, or saw the potential of
diplomacy from the beginning, he acted in a way that hurt his presidency. 54 The
decisions appeared to be ad hoc, starting with the President’s 2012 “red line”
comment that surprised many of his advisors, “underscore[d] the improvisational
nature of Mr. Obama’s approach to one of the most vexing crises in the world,” 55
50

David E. Sanger, After British Vote, Unusual Isolation for U.S. on Syria, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 30, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/31/world/after-british-vote-unusu
al-isolation-for-us-on-syria.html.
51
Mark Mazzetti et al., Obama’s Uncertain Path Amid Syria Bloodshed, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 22, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/23/world/middleeast/ obamas-uncertainpath-amid-syria-bloodshed.html?pagewanted=all.
52
Julian Pecquet & Ian Swanson, Obama Boxed In on Syria, THE HILL (Aug. 25,
2013, 10:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/middle-east-north-africa/318595-o
bama-in-a-corner-on-syria.
53
Mark Fitzpatrick, Destroying Syria’s Chemical Weapons, 55 SURVIVAL: GLOBAL
POL. & STRATEGY 107, 108 (2013) (claiming that Kerry’s remark “did not come totally out
of the thin air. Russia and the United States reportedly discussed the [disarmament] idea in
advance.”)
54
Fisher insists that President Obama was correct in seeking congressional
authorization, while David Cole has little patience with the argument that going to
Congress was a mistake. Instead of an unconstitutional decision to use military force absent
congressional authorization, President Obama “is now pursuing a path that accords with the
rule of law, and may in fact be more effective at deterring further use of chemical weapons.
Indeed, it may even prepare the way for a diplomatic strategy to end the underlying civil
war.” David Cole, Clogging the War Machine, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS BLOG (Sept. 19, 2013,
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Peter Baker et al., Off-the-Cuff Obama Line Put U.S. in Bind on Syria, N.Y. TIMES,
May 4, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/world/middleeast/ obamas-vow-on-che
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and forced the President’s hand after the August chemical attack. The off-hand
remark was a “terrible—and all too representative . . . blunder.” 56 Inside the
government, White House staffers were commenting (sometimes on the record)
about foot-dragging, “navel gazing,” and abrupt policy reversals on Syria. 57
President Obama’s abrupt decision to go to Congress “baffled even his closest
advisors” 58 and “overruled the advice of many of his aides who worried about [a
congressional] defeat.” 59
Ultimately, the President asked for the congressional backlash that
undermined the credibility of the original threat to use force and any threats he
might want to make in the future: “By giving Congress a vote, the President
appears not only to have tied his own hands in carrying out his threat, but to have
tipped off American rivals and partners that congressional support for new military
actions (for which the President might also seek congressional authorization) is
generally frail.” 60 President Obama’s advisors understood that Congress’s response
was a “potential turning point that could effectively define his foreign policy for
his final three years in office.” 61
From the standpoint of both unilateral-action theory and Neustadt’s
framework of presidential power, it looks less like an act of seasoned
statesmanship than a case where a President who was unsure what to do got very
lucky. Machiavelli noted the importance of fortuna to leaders, but he also
cautioned that it is a dangerous thing to rely on. 62
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(stating that at least some key White House aides learned about it only when the President
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II. IMPLICATIONS FOR UNILATERAL ACTION THEORIES
After a decade of tremendous growth in the literature on unilateral action,
scholars have established the basic elements of how presidents have wielded their
authority to accomplish governing and policy goals. This work has demonstrated
that presidents rely on their unilateral authority to make and reshape policy, change
institutional structures and procedures, and outmaneuver Congress in the
competition over influence and control. The structures and unique incentives of the
executive institution shaped presidential behavior, not the individual character of
presidents as embodied in presidential style, character, skill, or temperament. As
Moe put it, the best way to understand the presidency “is to stop thinking about
presidents as people and start thinking about them generically: as faceless,
nameless, institutional actors whose behavior is an institutional pattern.” 63 In
unilateral-action models, it does not matter who occupies the Oval Office because
presidential behavior is driven by predictable and understandable incentives that
produce regularized behavior.
One of the first things new presidents confront is the knowledge that they can
be held responsible for everything that happens in government. This is particularly
important on national security and (since 9/11) counterterrorism issues. President
Obama’s attitudes toward surveillance were different from those of candidate
Obama: “Like other presidents before him, the idealistic candidate . . . found that
the tricky trade-offs of national security issues look different to the person charged
with using that power to ensure public safety.” 64
This behavior has deep historical roots. Shortly after the 1800 election,
Alexander Hamilton predicted that President Thomas Jefferson would be more
supportive of a strong executive than his campaign rhetoric suggested. As
described by Rob Chernow, “whenever it suited his views, Jefferson had supported
executive power, as if he knew he would someday inherit the presidency and did
not wish to weaken the office.” 65 William Howard Taft took a more expansive
view of executive power as President than he did in his later publication, Our Chief
Magistrate and His Powers. 66 In noting the various authorities on different sides of
debates over presidential power, Justice Jackson observed that “it even seems that
President Taft cancels out Professor Taft.” 67
63
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Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (Jackson, J.,
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This perspective explains why President Obama took a broad view of
executive power once in office, but it offers less insight into what was different
about the Syria case. Here, the appropriate question is asking why, generally,
presidents might choose to be cautious in their exercise of unilateral powers.
Within the literature, there are several outstanding puzzles that are not yet
resolved. Among the most important is the inverse of the question of why
presidents rely on unilateral action: we know something about the circumstances in
which presidents are likely to rely on it, but somewhat less about the circumstances
in which presidents will decline to push the envelope. This is a difficult
phenomenon to study, because it is by definition difficult to observe things that do
not happen. We know when a President acts unilaterally because there is a clear
indicator of that action—an executive order, proclamation, directive, or some other
instrument. 68 A decision to not act is harder to interpret, because there will often be
nothing to see. Sometimes this process can be observed, particularly in those cases
where there is an ongoing and public discussion of the President’s role in
addressing an issue that is clearly within his discretionary authority. 69 But Syria
constitutes a specific instance in which a President publicly considered and then
just as publicly rejected an option to act unilaterally, therefore presenting an
opportunity to investigate it.
One demonstration of the problem is the effect of divided government on the
frequency of unilateral action. The logic of unilateral action predicts that presidents
will fall back on their unilateral power when other paths, especially legislative
ones, are blocked. Consequently, the expectation is that unilateral actions will
increase under divided government, when the President will have difficulty
assembling legislative majorities. Presidents and their staffs, as well as reporters,
urged a broader role for Congress and the judiciary, especially for war powers. As State
Department legal advisor during the first Obama administration, however, he took a
decidedly more expansive view of presidential authority, arguing that no congressional
declaration of war was necessary for the Libya operations because the President “could
reasonably determine that U.S. operations in Libya would serve important national
interests.” Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations,
112th Cong. 17 (2011) (statement of Harold Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State).
68
An obvious exception to this would be a classified action, such as President George
W. Bush’s secret 2001 order authorizing the National Security Agency to conduct
warrantless electronic surveillance. But some of these actions, such as the NSA
surveillance program, are eventually revealed through disclosure or leaks. See James Risen
& Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
2005, http://www/nytimes.com/2005/12/16program.htm.
69
An example is the 1993 controversy over President Clinton’s campaign promise to
issue an executive order ending the ban on gay military personnel. Faced with
overwhelming opposition within Congress and among military leaders, the President had
no choice but to back down. Instead, President Clinton proposed “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”
as a compromise, which Congress subsequently enacted in the 1994 Department of
Defense Authorization Act. Jeffrey T. Spoeri, The Pennsylvania Avenue Tug-of-War: The
President Versus Congress Over the Ban on Homosexuals in the Military, 45 WASH. U. J.
URB. & CONTEMP. L. 175, 175–76 (1994).
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behave as if they believe this to be true. After the Republican sweep in the 1994
midterm elections, in which the Republicans captured majorities for the first time
in forty years, White House officials forecasted more “regulations, executive
orders, and other presidential tools to work around Capitol Hill, much as Ronald
Reagan and George Bush did when the House and the Senate were in Democratic
hands.” 70 During the Clinton impeachment, advisor Paul Begala foresaw increased
reliance on executive orders and other unilateral tools. In an oft-repeated (and
reviled) quote, he summed up the thinking: “Stroke of the pen . . . . Law of the
land. Kind of cool.” 71 President Obama said much the same thing in 2011, telling
aides that “the administration needed to more aggressively use executive power to
govern in the face of Congressional obstructionism.” 72 In 2014, aides promised a
renewed focus on “an executive style of governing that aims to sidestep Congress
more often.” 73
The actual empirical practice, however, is much murkier. While we can easily
enough point to specific examples that fit the presumptive pattern, the full range of
data suggests a far more nuanced picture. Presidents rely less on unilateral action
when they face divided government, no matter what their staffs say they will do, in
part because of fear of a congressional backlash. Investigations, hearings, and the
prospect, however small, of Congress overturning a unilateral act can raise the
political cost of presidential adventurism.
William Howell and Jon Pevehouse have found strong evidence that
presidents are less likely to use military force when they face divided government,
concluding that Congress retains a substantial role in limiting presidential
discretion. 74 Their findings are based on a database of possible opportunities for
presidents to take this step. 75 They have analyzed patterns of how presidents use
force (or do not) to identify the causal factors that shape those decisions. 76 They
found that presidents are more likely to be cautious in ordering the use of force
when they face substantial and organized congressional opposition, as measured by
the number of seats controlled by the opposition party and measures of unity. 77
70
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Apr. 22, 2012, http://wwwnytimes.com/2014/04/23/us/politics/shift-on-executive-powers-l
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Presidents have frequently declined opportunities to use force, they found, with
outcomes shaped by the possibility of politically costly opposition. 78
Anticipating the reaction to a potential unilateral move is thus consistent with
underlying theory, as is deciding not to pursue a unilateral strategy when the
political costs are too high. This anticipation is, in Howell’s view, central to any
useful model of unilateral action:
[W]henever presidents contemplate a unilateral action, they anticipate
how Congress and the judiciary will respond. The limits to unilateral
powers are critically defined by the capacity, and willingness, of
Congress and the judiciary to overturn the president. Rarely will
presidents issue a unilateral directive when they know that other
branches of government will subsequently reverse it. 79
This serves as a useful general explanation. However, applying it to any specific
case requires caution, as the argument very easily becomes tautological: any
presidential choice to not to push the boundaries of executive power can then, by
definition, be attributed to a fear of a backlash or unacceptable political costs.
It is reasonable to think that Obama’s decision to defer to Congress was a
function of what the congressional response might have been on other issues if he
opted to go alone—the budget, Iran, appointments, relations with allies—or what
the political consequences would be of a poor outcome. Even so, the sequence of
the President’s decision-making remains difficult to explain as something other
than a series of miscalculations. If the political costs were unacceptably high, it
was still a mistake to declare that he wanted to attack and then cede that discretion
to Congress. In doing so, President Obama, quite literally, invited Congress to
repudiate him. A President who acknowledges in his own acts the utility of
unilateral power in the face of congressional resistance ought not to have put
himself in such a position, particularly when by his own admission it was
unnecessary.
The problem is not as simple as President Obama asking Congress for
something that it would not provide. Presidents do this routinely, never expect to
get everything they ask for, and rarely suffer for it. Rather, it was surrendering the
initiative by giving up the authority to make the decision. For presidents, there are
few things worse than vacillating or appearing indecisive, and failing to act can be
worse than making a bad decision:
Nothing invites censure like failing to utilize the full extent of authority
to meet a crisis head-on. The greatest disgrace a president can commit is
to sit idle while the world unravels around him. Presidents who advance
normatively bad policy, who patently pursue their own private interests,
or who engage in corrupt or even criminal behavior will usually receive
78
79
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their due admonishments. But when refusing to act—or worse yet,
proving unable to act precisely when action appears called for—
presidents invite all sorts of ridicule on themselves. 80
III. EFFECT AS PRECEDENT
Because the constitutional boundaries of executive power are ambiguous, they
are strongly shaped by practice through “common law constitutionalism.” 81 In
areas lacking a precise delineation of constitutional authorities, competition
between the President and Congress over political control plays a role as well.
Long-standing congressional deference to presidential action “may be treated as a
gloss on ‘Executive Power’ vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.” 82 In blunter
terms, a presidential unilateral move that is not unambiguously turned back by
either Congress or the judiciary becomes a justification that future presidents can
use to do the same thing or, more likely, push a bit further. 83
Will the deferral to Congress have any long-term effect on the allocation of
war powers? One way to answer the question is by examining previous instances
of presidents making similar decisions. There are two analogous cases: President
Dwight D. Eisenhower, who sought (and received) congressional authorizations to
deploy military forces in the straits of Taiwan in 1955 and the Middle East in
1957; and President Clinton, who asked Congress to support an air campaign in
Kosovo in 1999 (which Congress declined to do).
These cases are similar to President Obama’s in that neither President
conceded that he needed prior congressional approval for military action. President
Eisenhower asked for congressional authorization because he believed that
“national commitments would be stronger if entered into jointly by both
branches,” 84 not because he felt that he lacked the requisite constitutional authority
to deploy troops without it. 85 Congressional action was politically useful, in other
80
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J., concurring).
83
Even a seemingly trivial power can follow this pattern. Robert Spitzer notes that
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words, but not required. President Eisenhower’s 1955 request to Congress was
explicit on this point: in asking for authorization to deploy troops to Formosa
Straits, he claimed that “authority for some of the actions which might be required
would be inherent in the authority of the Commander-in-Chief,” but a
congressional resolution “would make clear the unified and serious intention of our
Government, our Congress, and our people.” 86 In this regard, his position was the
same as President Obama’s. 87
President Clinton’s 1999 request was likewise a matter of political utility. In a
March 23, 1999, letter to Senate leadership, he said, “[W]ithout regard to our
differing views on the Constitution about the use of force, I ask for your legislative
support as we address the crisis in Kosovo.” 88 The Senate voted 58–41 to approve
military action. 89 President Clinton ordered the strikes to begin the next day, before
the House had acted. 90 A month later, the resolution failed to pass the House,
losing on a 213–213 tie. 91
President Eisenhower has been praised for taking a narrow view of the
presidential war power. Louis Fisher observed that President Eisenhower “avoided
unilateral moves in dispatching troops abroad” in reaction to President Harry S.
Truman’s actions in Korea and in the Steel Seizure case. 92 Richard Grimmett
the Congress” enhances the credibility of U.S. commitments. Id. at 120. Fisher notes that
when President Eisenhower was asked a direct question on the matter by House Majority
Leader John McCormack (D-Mass.) in 1957, the President responded that “greater effect
could be had from a consensus of Executive and Legislative opinion . . . . [T]he
Constitution assumes that our two branches of government should get along together.” Id.
at 121 (quoting DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, WAGING PEACE 179 (1965)).
86
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PAPERS 208, 209–10 (March 8, 1958).
87
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offers a slight qualification, arguing that apart from actions to evacuate or protect
U.S. civilians and military personnel in conflict areas, President Eisenhower did
not unilaterally order the use of force. 93
But President Eisenhower may not have been quite as restrained as these
sources claim. According to a widely used database of military actions, President
Eisenhower used military force as a political threat fifty-eight times, including
major cases in Asia, Central America, the Middle East, Europe, and Africa. 94 Not
all of these cases involved large-scale deployments, but all were either active or
covert, or threatened military operations.95 Other instances of President
Eisenhower’s use of force were at least arguably unilateral. The deployment of
fourteen thousand Marines to Lebanon in July 1958 was nominally permitted by
the 1957 congressional authorization, 96 but President Eisenhower made no mention
of the authorization in announcing the step, saying only that he made the decision
“after taking advice from leaders of both the Executive and Congressional
branches of the government.” 97 Some scholars concluded that President
Eisenhower was relying on his “inherent” constitutional power 98 or “the ever more
capacious presidential prerogative.” 99
In fact, President Eisenhower held a broad view of the executive’s inherent
powers. He was especially aggressive in the use of covert operations without
congressional authorization, including U.S. involvement in the overthrowing of
governments in Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954. 100 The CIA’s own internal
history of its intervention in Guatemala conceded the “blatant illegality” of a
blockade imposed as part of the operation and the boarding of French and British
ships “in defiance of international law.” 101 It was clear that President Eisenhower
understood a blockade to be an unambiguous act of war; in responding to
suggestions that he impose a blockade of China in response to that country’s
espionage trials and convictions against American pilots shot down during the
Korean War, he stated,
93
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A blockade is an act in war intended to bring your adversary to your
way of thinking or to his knees. . . . [T]he word “blockade,” is, so far as I
know, an act of war, a part of war. I have not checked this with the
constitutional lawyers, but I believe it to be true. 102
At a minimum, President Eisenhower’s desire to secure Congress’s support for
large military operations was inconsistent with his general constitutional view of
the President’s “war powers” and, as shown above, did not stop him from using
military force when he deemed it necessary.
Moreover, not every observer praised the resolutions as examples of careful
deliberation or restraint. Matthew Crenson and Benjamin Ginsburg argue that
“Eisenhower in effect demanded a blank check from Congress for possible military
action in the Taiwan Straits and the Middle East.” 103 Julian Zelizer, a historian,
saw the Formosa Resolution as “the second step in the expansion of presidential
war-making authority that began when President Truman sent troops to Korea
without a formal declaration of war,” because President Eisenhower would not
need additional congressional action before initiating even full-scale conflict. 104
Stephen Griffin concludes that the resolutions represented “nothing unusual in the
terms of . . . legal authority” but still criticizes them as merely “ways for presidents
to get Congress on board rather than truly deliberate and build a cycle of
accountability.” 105
More germane to the present case is that President Eisenhower’s request for
advance authorization did not interrupt the pattern of increasing presidential
discretion in using military force. Mariah Zeisberg finds in these requests a broader
pattern that was not constricting:
By the end of the Eisenhower administration, a kind of
accommodation had been reached. Presidents would seek legislative
support, but with the idea that the legislature was supporting a
constitutional power that was already the president’s. This would allow
for ongoing legislative participation in constructing a structured
defensive politics—naming enemies, priorities, and focusing attention—
while reinforcing the constitutional construction of the independent
presidential defensive war powers that had been achieved in the past ten
years. 106
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CONCLUSION
President Obama’s decision to defer to Congress will not serve as a precedent
that constrains future presidents, since it did not resolve any questions about the
correct distribution of the constitutional war powers and was a pragmatic judgment
rather than a principled one. Previous instances of presidents making analogous
decisions had no lasting effect on the overall trend toward increasing presidential
discretion in using military force.
Presidential unilateralism begets other instances of unilateral action.
Furthermore, engaging Congress in what is more commonly an area of unilateral
action not only fails to serve as a precedent in the other direction but can also lead
to more unilateralism. The process of presidential action could certainly be
described as a ratchet process. At the same time, it is unrealistic to expect a single
decision to reverse a long-standing historical trend. Eric Posner and Adrian
Vermeule have little patience with ratchet arguments in any event, insisting that
the necessary conditions do not exist and that the term serves as a loose label
“often confused with a simple trend or with endogenous but reversible change in
some variable that would quickly revert to its original value if other legal or social
conditions changed.” 107
If President Obama’s decision will have little long-term effect on the
distribution of power, what lessons can be drawn from it? We might reframe the
underlying prediction of maximizing discretion as a normative one for which
presidents need to be aware that foregoing unilateral action comes with political
cost. In 2014, President Obama and his aides concluded that he has not been
aggressive enough in asserting the office’s capacity to act as a general matter.
Reviewing 2013—which the White House concedes was not a very good year for
the President—Senior Advisor Dan Pfeiffer concluded that the President “too often
governed more like a prime minister than a President” and recommended an
emphasis on “an executive style of governing that aims to sidestep Congress more
often.” 108 It was more of a rhetorical shift than a substantive one, since President
Obama had hardly shied away from unilateral action earlier in his presidency, with
a few exceptions. But it is more consistent with unilateral theory, and it suggests
that the President recognizes the risks of passivity and the importance of retaining
the initiative.
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